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FLORENT PEREK & MAARTEN LEMMENS
Abstracts
On the basis of a corpus-based study of the at-frame in English,  this  article  evaluates
Goldberg’s (2006) hypothesis that constructional meaning originates with the meaning of
the verbs frequently occurring in a given syntactic pattern. Our study reveals that for the
at-construction,  this  hypothesis  does  not  hold:  the  constructional  meaning  is  poorly
reflected by the distribution of the verbs, and is only arrived at by attending to specific
aspects of the semantics of the verbs occurring in it. This suggests that a more complex
learning strategy than the simple import of lexical semantics into constructions is needed,
especially to account for the emergence of constructions whose meaning is not lexicalized
by any verb in the language.
A partir  d’une étude sur corpus de la construction en at  en anglais,  cet  article  évalue
l’hypothèse  de  Goldberg  (2006)  selon  laquelle  le  sens  des  constructions  syntaxiques
provient du sens des verbes fréquemment rencontrés dans un motif syntaxique donné.
Notre  étude  révèle  que  cette  hypothèse  ne  s’applique  pas  à  la  construction  en  at:  la
distribution  verbale  ne  reflète  que  médiocrement  le  sens  constructionnel,  qui  n’est
déduisible  qu’en  retenant  certains  aspects  spécifiques  de  la  sémantique  des  verbes
observés dans la construction. Cela suggère qu’une stratégie d’acquisition plus complexe
que la simple importation de sémantique lexicale dans les constructions est requise, en
particulier pour expliquer l’émergence de constructions dont le sens n’est lexicalisé par
aucun verbe de la langue.
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1. Introduction
2. The lexical origin of argument
structure semantics
This paper reports an inquiry into the origin of constructional meaning, asking
what elements speakers retain from the meaning of actual utterances when they
form constructional generalizations.1 One of the hypotheses currently entertained
in Construction Grammar (cf. Goldberg 2006) holds that constructional meaning
originates with the meaning of the verbs frequently occurring in a given syntactic
pattern.  The  present  study  of  the  at-construction  reveals,  however,  that  the
connection  between  the  verbal  distribution  and  the  semantic  abstraction
underlying  the  construction  is  not  so  straightforward.  As  our  case  study  will
illustrate,  the central  meaning of the at-construction is  not  lexicalized by any
verb in the distribution (or elsewhere in the language, for that matter) and thus
must emerge through a more complex operation than the simple association of
the  meaning  of  the  most  frequent  verb  with  the  syntactic  pattern.  While  the
lexical origin of constructional meaning may hold for some of the constructions
discussed in the literature, the origin of the conative at-construction seems to lie
elsewhere, as we will show.
1
The  article  is  structured  as  follows.  The  theoretical  and  methodological
underpinnings  of  our  study  are  presented  in  Section  2.  We  discuss  the
constructional  approach  to  argument  structure,  particularly  emphasizing  the
nature of constructions and the origin of constructional meaning, which lie at the
basis of Goldberg’s claims mentioned above. Section 3 is concerned with a more
detailed characterization of the semantics of the at-construction, in which one of
the  arguments  of  the  verb  is  realized  by  a  post-verbal  prepositional  phrase
headed by at; this includes the so-called Conative construction, a classical case of
transitive alternation (e.g., John kicked the ball vs. John kicked at the ball), as
well  as  other  uses  of  this  syntactic  frame.  Drawing  on  the  treatment  of  that
construction  in  the  cognitive  linguistics  literature,  a  unified  constructional
meaning can be distilled that would account for all its uses. We then evaluate this
analysis  against  the  use  of  the  construction  in  a  general  corpus  of  English,
revealing that the predictions of the lexical origin hypothesis do not hold for this
particular case. In Section 4, we discuss the theoretical implications of our study
and  argue  that  the  lexical  origin  hypothesis  by  itself  cannot  account  for  the
distribution of the conative at-construction and that its meaning may have arisen
through alternation patterns.
2
It is a trivial fact that verbs can occur in several different syntactic frames, as
exemplified with the verb kick in (1a) to (1g) below.
3
(1) a. Bill kicked the ball.
b. Bill kicked at the ball.
c. Bill kicked the ball off the field.
d. Bill kicked the man unconscious.
e. Bill kicked the ball to Bo.
f. Bill kicked Bo the ball.
g. Bill kicked his way through the crowd.
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These  different  so-called  argument  structures  of  a  verb  correspond  (i)  to
different  kinds  of  events,  e.g.,  (1a)  vs.  (1b)  vs.  (1g),  (ii)  to  constructions  with
different types or number of arguments, e.g., (1a) vs. (1b), vs (1c) vs. (1d), or (iii)
to alternative ways of linguistically encoding the participants of the same kind of
event, e.g., the dative alternation, exemplified by (1e) vs. (1f).
4
In  Construction  Grammar,  argument  structures  are  seen  as  independent
pairings of form and function (i.e., constructions), which means that (i) they exist
independently from verbs and (ii)  they are able to convey meaning on and of
their  own. Argument Structure Constructions (ASCs) are defined by Goldberg
(1995, 2006) as a pairing of a schematized representation of an event including a
list  of  semantic  roles  specific  to  the  construction,  with  morphosyntactic
information as to how these roles are realized (e.g., word order, case marking).
For  example,  the  caused-motion  construction  (Goldberg  1995:   Chapter  7),
illustrated in (2) and (3) and schematically represented in (4), pairs a syntactic
pattern containing a subject, a direct object and a locative oblique to a general
scene of caused change of location, in which the subject is linked to the Agent
role (the causer of the change of location), the direct object to the Patient role
(the entity undergoing the change of location) and the locative oblique to the
Path role (the trajectory followed by the patient). While in (2) the meaning of
caused  transfer  is  already  conveyed  by  the  verb  send,  (3)  exemplifies  the
potential of the construction to convey meaning on and of its own, since squeeze
does not convey an event of “caused motion”; the resulting interpretation is thus
not plausibly conveyed by the verb and must be attributed to the syntax itself.
5
(2) John sent a package to London.
(3) John squeezed the toothpaste out of the tube.
(4) Form : Subject Verb Object ObliqueLocative
Meaning : Agent CAUSE ( Patient GO Path )
The constructional meaning serves as the basis for generalizing the argument
structure to other semantically compatible verbs, even in cases where these verbs
have not been observed with that syntax in the input. This is how a usage-based,
constructionist theory of argument realization accounts for how speakers predict
the association between verbs and their argument frames on the sole basis of the
input  without  having  to  posit  innate  linking  rules  (as  does  Pinker  1989,  for
example).
6
Central indeed to Goldberg’s (2006) proposals are the mechanisms that she
posits to explain how constructions come into being. Committed to a usage-based
view of language, she claims that ASCs are gradually emergent generalizations
over individual instances of language in use. In other words, speakers are able to
learn  correlations  between a  syntactic  form and a  clausal  meaning  and store
them as constructions. The current hypothesis as formulated by Goldberg (2006)
argues  for  a  lexical  origin  of  constructional  meaning;  in  the  case  of  ASCs,
constructional  meaning  is  an  abstraction  over  the  meaning  of  verbs  that
frequently  occur in a  given syntactic  frame.2  As  Goldberg  (2006:  92)  puts  it,
“grammatical  constructions may arise developmentally  as generalizations over
lexical items in particular patterns”.
7
The lexical origin of constructional meaning is evidenced by the importance of
“basic  purpose  verbs”  in  the  acquisition  of  argument  structure.  Goldberg
(1999: 202) suggests that “the generalization to constructional meaning is based
largely on the meanings of highly frequent ‘light’ verbs: verbs with very general
meanings”, in line with Fillmore et al.’s claim that ‘‘it is possible to think of the
argument structure patterns as in some sense ‘derived from’ the semantics of
8
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their most neutral verb” (forthc.: section 3.2). She finds that for each studied ASC
there is such a corresponding verb and that the distribution of each construction
is severely biased towards this verb, accounting for a huge number of instances in
the input to children (20 to 40%).3 Secondly, Goldberg says that these verbs are
semantically basic and their meaning is very close to that of the corresponding
construction.  For  example,  for  the  caused-motion  construction,  such  a  verb
would be put, for the ditransitive (the double-object pattern, as in (1f) above),
give. Goldberg et al. (2004) and Goldberg & Casenhiser (2006) experimentally
show that the presence of such “basic purpose verbs” facilitates the acquisition of
ASCs by adult  speakers as  well  as  children,  which is  interpreted by Goldberg
(2006: 79) as implying that “the high frequency of particular verbs in particular
constructions  facilitates  children’s  unconsciously  establishing  a  correlation
between the meaning of  a particular verb in a constructional  pattern and the
pattern itself, giving rise to an association between meaning and form”. This view
is in line with non-linguistic  learning,  where it  has been shown that category
learning is facilitated by a low-variance input (cf. Markman & Maddox 2003) and
that  prototypicality  correlates  with  high  token  frequency  (cf.  Nosofky  1988,
Rosch  &  Mervis  1975).  The  facilitatory  effect  of  a  highly  frequent  verb
semantically  congruent  with  the  construction  is  evidence  that  when  speakers
map meaning onto a phrasal  pattern,  they retrieve this meaning from that of
individual verbs occurring in it. The meaning of the construction is thus to a large
extent predicted by the meaning of that highly frequent verb.
The connection between the meaning of a construction and the meaning of the
verbs occurring in it is also borne out by several corpus studies. Goldberg et al.
(2004)  report  the  upper  part  of  the  distributions  of  the  intransitive-motion,
caused-motion and ditransitive constructions in child-directed speech from the
Bates et al. (1988) corpus and note that each construction is biased towards verbs
that closely match the constructional meaning: respectively go (39%), put (38%)
and give (20%). Along the same lines, Stefanowitsch & Gries’ (2003: 227-230)
collostructional  analysis  of  the  ditransitive  construction  shows  that  the  verbs
most attracted by a construction are those most closely corresponding to the core
meaning  of  that  construction.  For  example,  among  the  ten  strongest  verbal
collocates of the ditransitive, six are in some way verbs of transfer (either actual
or abstract – transfer of a message or of knowledge): give, tell, send, offer, teach
and award,  and the attraction of give  is particularly strong. The authors note
that “[it] seems that strong collexemes of a construction provide a good indicator
of its meaning” (idem: 227). In an unpublished study, Perek (2009) extracted the
verbal  distribution of  five Argument Structure Constructions from the spoken
part of the ICE-GB. Table 1 below summarizes the results of the corpus search.
9
Construction Syntax4 Meaning
Most
frequent
verb
Other frequent verbs
(>1%)
Ditransitive
SubjX-
V-Obj1Y-Obj2Z
X CAUSE Y
TO HAVE Z
give
(50%)
tell (14%), show (8%),
offer (5%), send (4%),
get (3%), ask, do (2%
each), buy, teach (1%
each)
Caused-
motion
SubjX-
V-ObjY-OblZ
X CAUSE Y
TO GO Z put (24%)
give (12%), take (9%),
get (8%), send (6%),
bring (4%), leave (3%),
place, throw (2% each),
impose, add, hand,
offer, pay, sit (1% each)
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Table 1: Summarized distributional properties of five Argument Structure Constructions; source:
spoken part of the ICE-GB
Intransitive-
motion
SubjX-V-OblY X GO Y go (32%)
come (24%), get (7%),
move, run (3% each),
walk, return, arrive (2%
each), fall, embark,
head, fly (1% each)
Resultative
SubjX-
V-ObjY-OblZ
X CAUSE Y
TO
BECOME Z
make
(40%)
put (14%), get, leave
(9%), bring (5%), turn
(4%), drive, take (2%
each), elect, force,
have, let, throw (1%
each)
Intransitive-
resultative
SubjX-V-OblY
X BECOME
Y
become
(38%)
get (30%), go (8%),
come (4%), fall, end up
(3% each), prove (2%),
grow, evolve, form (1%)
These data both comply with the results in Goldberg et al. (2004) mentioned
above and complement them by providing figures for two other constructions.
They show that for each of the studied constructions there is one verb that stands
out more than others (notice that for the intransitive-motion construction, both
go and come are (unsurprisingly) highly frequent) and that the meaning of that
verb in the given syntactic frame5 closely matches the meaning conveyed by the
construction.
10
In the model outlined above,  the relation between the meaning of  frequent
verbs in the distribution and the meaning of the construction is straightforward.
We  can  posit  that  the  cited  argument  structure  constructions  all  feature  the
following distributional properties:
11
(i) The distribution of the construction is skewed towards a single verb V.
(ii) The central meaning of V is close (if not identical) to the meaning of the
construction.
(iii) The distribution contains many hyponyms of V.
These  properties  make  the  lexical  origin  hypothesis  empirically  tenable,  at
least  for  the  constructions  discussed.  If  for  some  other  construction,  these
properties  do  not  hold  or  make conflicting  predictions  along the  lines  of  the
lexical origin hypothesis, then an alternative account will be needed.
12
An additional comment is in order. A key proposal in Goldberg’s seminal work
is that there can be extensions from a construction’s prototype which account for
verbs which are seemingly at odds with the prototypical meaning. For example,
the ditransitive construction, with its central meaning ‘X CAUSE Y TO HAVE Z’,
is the basis for extensions to meanings such as ‘X ENABLES Y TO HAVE Z’ and
‘X  CAUSE  Y  NOT  TO  HAVE  Z’,  which  accounts  for  the  occurrence  in  the
ditransitive syntax of verbs such as permit and allow for the former and refuse
and deny  for the latter. In fact,  these cases may well be accounted for by the
lexical  origin  hypothesis,  since  these  semantic  extensions  are  likely  to  be
motivated by the relevant parts of the verbal distribution. As Croft points out, the
classes  of  verbs  that  instantiate  each  of  these  subconstructions  are  mutually
exclusive, so that “the variation in the ditransitive construction’s meaning is not
true polysemy. Each verbal semantic class is associated with only one sense of the
ditransitive  construction”  (2003:   55);  instead  the  alleged  extensions  of  the
ditransitive  should better  be  considered as  what  he  terms “verb-class-specific
constructions” (idem: 56). Whatever the actual mental representation looks like
13
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3. A cognitive account of the
at-construction
3.1 The conative alternation
(this  is  largely  an  empirical  question),  it  seems  that  at  least  some  of  these
subconstructions can plausibly get their meaning not from extension from the
constructional  prototype  but  directly  from  lexical  abstraction.  Whether  the
verb-class-specific constructions might be biased towards one single verb from
which they would get their extended meaning is unclear but not unlikely; this is,
however, not an issue dealt with here.
In this paper, we leave the domain of the “typical” ASCs which have been dealt
with  quite  extensively  in  the  literature,  such  as  the  ditransitive,  the  caused-
motion or the intransitive-motion constructions, and focus on a lesser studied
syntactic pattern, the at-frame,6 which we define as a complementation pattern
that realizes one argument of  a verb as a (directly) post-verbal7  prepositional
phrase  headed  by  the  preposition  at  (NP-Subj  Vb  at-PP).  If  we  take  a
constructional approach to argument structure, we have no a priori  reason to
think that this argument realization pattern is not licensed by a construction, i.e.,
that it does not convey a meaning that serves as a basis to predict which verbs
can or cannot occur with that argument structure.
14
In the next section, we present such a construction grammar account of the
instances of the at-frame. Putting together the various analyses that have been
presented  in  the  literature,  we  will  present  a  conceivable  account  of  the
constructional meaning that emerges from these analyses. We then present our
survey of this construction in the ICE-GB, revealing a contrast between what the
lexical origin of constructional meaning predicts and the actual distribution of
the construction in the corpus.  This  discrepancy suggests  that  the connection
between  constructional  meaning  and  lexical  meaning  may  not  be  as
straightforward as  it  is  usually  assumed.  The  implications  of  this  finding  are
discussed in Section 4.
15
In this section, we describe the various uses of the at-frame. We first deal with
the conative frame, commonly known in the linguistic literature as one of the
variants in the conative alternation (cf. Levin 1993: 41-42). Most verbs occurring
on the conative frame alternate with the transitive construction. We describe the
semantics  of  the conative variant  in  contrast  to  the transitive  variant,  mainly
drawing on Broccias’ (2001) analysis. In the second part of this section, we relate
the conative frame to the other instances of the at-frame, basing ourselves on
Goldberg’s  construction  grammar  account  and  subsequently  introducing  a
plausible schematic meaning of the at-construction. Finally, we examine how the
at-frame is used in the ICE-GB corpus.
16
The conative  frame,  named after  Latin  conor/conari  ‘to  try’,  is  most  often
treated with reference to the conative alternation, a transitivity alternation that
modifies the interpretation of a transitive verb towards denoting “an ‘attempted
action’  without specifying whether the action was actually  carried out” (Levin
1993: 42). The transitive variant, in contrast, specifies that the action has indeed
been carried out. For example, notice the contrast between the following pairs of
examples:
17
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(5) a. I shot the sheriff.
b. I shot at the sheriff.
(6) a. Bill kicked the ball.
b. Bill kicked at the ball.
(5a) entails that the bullet actually reached the target (the sheriff) but such an
entailment does not hold in (5b). Similarly, (6a) necessarily entails that Bill’s foot
actually entered in contact with the ball, whereas in (6b), Bill may have missed.
In  each  of  the  conative  counterparts  of  the  alternation,  the  action  is  thus
described as an attempt and nothing is said about the success of that attempt.
18
Levin suggests  that  the  conative  alternation is  restricted to  transitive  verbs
involving  contact  and  motion,  but  later  studies  point  out  that  it  is  an
oversimplification of the actual distribution, and that Levin’s analysis in terms of
“attempted action” (or Goldberg’s (1995) fairly similar idea of “intended result”)
does not account for the resulting semantics of all alternating verbs, which leads
Van  der  Leek  (1996)  and  Broccias  (2001)  to  refine  the  semantics  of  the
construction. Broccias distinguishes at least two cases, one case “where the action
denoted by the (transitive use) of the verb does not necessarily take place” and
one case “where the verbal event does take place, though in a bit-by-bit fashion”
(2001:   69).  Broccias’  cognitive  analysis  describes  the  semantics  of  conative
clauses in terms of two scenarios.
19
First, the allative schema corresponds to the above analysis of the conative
as an “attempted action”, exemplified by (5b) and (6b). It denotes the emission of
a  force  (which  may  be  metaphorically  construed)  towards  a  goal,  but  with
forceful  contact  not  being  linguistically  encoded  and  thus  backgrounded  and
merely  implied.  The  transitive  counterpart,  in  contrast,  linguistically  encodes
both  emission  and  contact.8  The  allative  schema  thus  includes  the  lack  of
necessary affectedness of the prepositional object referent, which “correlates with
notions such as randomness, attack, and difficulty, which are often associated
with  the  allative  construction”  (Broccias  2001:   74-75).  Note  that  the  notion
“emission of a force” is broadly construed and can correspond to different types
of  physical  manifestation,  such as  a  fired weapon in  (5b),  a  body part  set  in
motion (a leg in (6b), an arm in (7) below), or even the moving agent itself in (8).
20
(7) He clutched desperately at the branch as he fell. (from Broccias 2001: 73)
(8) Sally ran at Chris. (ibid.)
The ablative schema is associated with continuous actions, either because it
is repeated (i.e., in a “bit-by-bit” manner) or because one single instance of the
action is prolonged. This schema bears some connection to the allative schema,
in that it also incorporates a notion of attempt, which, however, does not apply to
the verbal event itself but rather to its expected or desired consequences. In other
words, some action is performed upon an entity in an attempt to bring about
some  result,  which  can  belong  to  one  of  the  following  three  categories:  (i)
removal of a substance or an entity (e.g., caused motion of an entity as in (9)),
(ii)  release  (the  coming  about  of  a  perceptual  state  predicated  of  either  the
subject referent or the object referent, e.g., sensation as in (10), attention as in
(11) and information as in (12)) and (iii) creation/destruction (e.g., ingestion as
in (13) and (14)).
21
(9) The horse pulled at the cart. (idem:75)
(10) … and tears stung at her eyes. (idem:77; from BNC, HGK 2219)
(11) The child pulled at his mother’s coat, wanting to be lifted up. (idem:78; from
LDELC)
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3.2 A construction grammar account
(12) Cardiff nudged at that swollen head with his shoe. (idem:78; from BNC, G0E
3258)
(13) Pat ate at her sandwich.
(14) James Bond sipped at his Martini.
(9)  contrasts  with  its  transitive  variant  not  by  entailing  that  the  action  of
pulling  has  not  been  carried  out,  but  rather  by  leaving  unspecified  the
consequence of that action (whereas the transitive The horse pulled the cart does
entail the motion of the cart as a result of the pulling). Similarly, (13) and (14)
contrast  with  their  transitive  counterparts  (Pat  ate  her  sandwich and James
Bond sipped his Martini) in that they entail that the substance has not been fully
ingested; they also contrast with examples of the allative schema such as (5b) and
(6b) in that they do not feature the same notion of attempt: some of the sandwich
and some of the Martini has indeed been successfully eaten/drunk.
22
In  some  cases,  as  in  examples  (15)  and  (16)  below,  the  two  schemata  are
combined,  i.e.,  they  involve  both  (i)  the  emission  of  a  force  (which  may  be
metaphorical)  directed  towards  a  target,  and  (ii)  a  continuous  action  in  an
attempt to bring about some (future) result, not necessarily successfully.
23
(15) Sam sprayed at the trees with insecticide. (from Broccias 2001: 79)
(16) He was working at his painting. (ibid.)
In addition to the verbs entering the conative alternation, many other verbs
realize one of their arguments with an at-phrase, without there being a transitive
variant  realizing  the  same  argument  with  a  direct  object.  Verbs  of  volitional
visual perception, exemplified by (17a) below, are typically used in this syntactic
frame, but are ungrammatical in the transitive construction (cf. (17b)).
24
(17) a. Bill looked/peered/glanced/stared at the girl next to him.
b. *Bill looked/peered/glanced/stared the girl next to him.
These instances of  the at-frame usually  receive  a  lexically-based treatment,
distinguished from the conative frame. It is listed as one of the complementation
options  for  verbs  of  visual  perception  (peer-verbs  in  Levin’s  (1993:   187)
classification). Van der Leek (1996) and Broccias (2001) do not even mention
visual  perception in their  examples.  Goldberg (1995:  64),  however,  notes that
such cases “bear an obvious similarity to [instances of the allative schema]”
(our  emphasis)  and  explicitly  considers  them  licensed  by  one  and  the  same
construction.  She  briefly  outlines  a  construction  grammar  account  of  the
at-frame (1995: 63-64; see Figure 1 below), in which the construction receives a
central  meaning  of  ‘directed  action’  which  is  further  paraphrased  by  ‘Agent
DIRECTS ACTION AT Target’.9
25
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Figure 1: Goldberg’s representation of the at-construction
(taken from Goldberg 1995: 64)
In Goldberg’s (1995) model, a construction is compatible at least with verbs
whose  meaning  elaborates  in  some  way  the  constructional  meaning.  This
semantic relation makes the at-construction compatible with verbs that denote
types of directed action. Goldberg argues that the occurrence of verbs of visual
perception such as look  and aim  in the at-construction is  motivated by  their
categorization as directed actions (direction of the gaze); hence, by enlarging the
scope of the construction, she can coherently account for a syntactic fact that was
previously  not  related  to  the  conative  frame  but  rather  considered  as  an
idiosyncrasy of a lexical class. Similarly, verbs of sound emission such as scream
and shout,  as well as other verbs such as fire  and shoot  can be considered as
directed actions, which also motivates their occurrence in the construction. The
occurrence  of  smile  and  laugh  (among  others)  is  predicted  by  their
conceptualization as directed actions of a more abstract kind.
26
This  schematic  meaning  ‘directed  action’  can  be  decomposed  into  two
components:  an orientational  component,  corresponding to some entity being
oriented in the direction of a target, and a directional component, corresponding
to an unbounded trajectory defined by the orientational component. A verb is
compatible with this constructional meaning under the essential condition that
its  frame semantics refer to an entity whose properties allows to be oriented.
Verbs of volitional visual perception are compatible by this construction as the
eye is an entity which can be oriented; the gaze follows the trajectory defined by
this orientation. Similarly, facial expressions (such as a smile) can be oriented in
a  given  direction  through  different  orientations  of  the  head.  Another  typical
example of directed action is point, which in its basic concrete sense provides as
an orientational component the hand set in such a given spatial configuration
that  it  defines  a  direction.  The  orientational  component  (and  hence  the
directional  component  that  it  defines)  can  also  be  construed  in  non-physical
fields. For instance, with verbs of sound emission such as shout and scream, the
orientational  component  is  not  always  purely  physical  but  corresponds  more
broadly  to  the  production  of  a  sound  for  a  target  “recipient”,  which  is
orientational in an abstract sense.
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While Goldberg’s model does not exclude there to be constructional polysemy,
her account of the at-construction outlined above is still essentially monosemic:
the  construction  conveys  a  single  maximally  abstract  (hence  vague)  meaning
shared  by  all  instances  of  the  construction,  which  is  by  itself  insufficient  to
predict  the  meaning  of  all  uses  of  the  at-frame  on  the  basis  of  strict
compositionality:  meaning  construction  must  still  go  a  long  way  from  the
meaning of the parts (the construction, the verb and the argument role fillers) to
a  fully  integrated  semantic  representation  of  the  event.  In  Goldberg’s  model,
on-line coercion operations bear this burden: in case of type mismatch between
28
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3.3 The at-construction in use
the  verbal  meaning  and  the  constructional  meaning,  the  latter  overrides  the
former and speakers must find a way to integrate the verbal meaning into the
constructional meaning.
Some of these coercion operations can be conventionalized and rule-like, in
that they explicitly specify how the meaning of the verb and the meaning of the
construction  are  integrated  into  a  coherent  interpretation  and  thus  yield  a
predictable output in terms of semantic relations established between the two
meanings. In this case, Goldberg’s model falls into what Croft (1998b: 153) terms
the “derivational model”, viz. one which “involves a conventional rule applying to
the particular grammatical element, operation or construction” (idem: 155). This
is what is argued to happen with the semantic relation “intended result”: when a
verb including the semantic components of motion and contact fuses with the
construction,  it  “designates  the  intended  result  of  the  act  denoted  by  the
construction” (Goldberg 1995:  63). For example, the sentence Ethel  strikes  at
Fred,  given by  Goldberg,  is  posited  to  mean that  “Ethel  does  not  necessarily
strike Fred, but striking him is the intended result of the directed action” (ibid.).
Thus,  in  Goldberg’s  approach,  the  “attempted action”  reading  does  not  come
from an intrinsic part of the construction, but rather emerges from the coercion
of the verbal meaning into the constructional meaning.
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Yet not all coercion operations need be conventional and rule-like, in which
case  the  model  tends  towards  what  Croft  (1998b:   154)  terms  a  “pragmatic
model”, that is one in which “the hearer is expected to figure out the semantics of
the  combination from the  context  and general  cognitive  principles”.  Actually,
even the putatively conventional relation “intended result” does not accurately
apply to all cases as posited in Goldberg’s account. For example, a verb like kick
falls into this relation, as it entails both motion and contact; however, a sentence
like He kicked at the door does certainly entail in most contexts that contact was
made with the door; the intended result which does not obtain, however, is the
actual opening of the door, which is not a priori given by the semantics of the
verb alone but the situation as a whole. Goldberg does not mention examples of
the ablative schema in her data and they cannot be accounted for by the relation
of “intended result”; it remains to be examined whether and how the schema can
be accounted for by another, more complex coercion operation and whether this
operation should be conventionalized.
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As we mentioned in Section 2, Goldberg (2006) suggests that constructional
meaning emerges from schematization of the meaning of individual verbs. Any
lexical bias should be viewed as providing prototypical instances and should be a
strong predictor of what the constructional meaning looks like. As we will see in
the next section, an examination of usage data as provided by a corpus leads to a
different conclusion than the above introspective account.
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To our knowledge, there is no in depth corpus study of the at-frame (and the
conative frame in particular) comparable to those that have been performed on
other, more typical constructions. The studies mentioned in the previous section
are based on individual examples, either invented or collected from corpora, and
are  aimed  at  uncovering  the  full  semantic  potential  of  the  construction,
regardless  of  the  frequency  of  the  interpretations  at  hand.  Apart  from  some
probably  vague  intuitions,  we  do  not  really  have  a  clear  picture  of  how  the
at-frame is distributed over different verbs in actual usage. This study makes a
first  modest  step  towards  mending  this  gap,  even  though  we  immediately
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acknowledge that a study on a bigger corpus would be even more beneficial.
On the basis of the analysis of the at-construction outlined above, we manually
identified the instances of the at-construction in the corpus. We first queried the
corpus  for  the  pattern  [NPSubject  V  at  NP]10  and  selected  the  citations
corresponding to the cases described in Section 3, which yielded 319 instances.
The distribution of verbs in the at-construction is reported in Table 2.
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Verb Frequency(at-construction:all)
Collostructional
strength
look (338:1201) ∞
glance (8:12) 17.18
shout (5:24) 7.81
stare (4:18) 6.46
point (4:112) 3.26
scream (2:11) 3.23
aim (3:57) 3.04
pick (4:167) 2.62
swing (2:23) 2.58
work (8:704) 2.58
smile (2:24) 2.54
fire (2:28) 2.41
clutch (1:4) 1.88
dive (1:4) 1.88
tug (1:4) 1.88
gaze (1:5) 1.78
sniff (1:5) 1.78
suck (1:5) 1.78
hint (1:7) 1.64
leap (1:7) 1.64
pluck (1:7) 1.64
peer (1:10) 1.49
flick (1:14) 1.34
laugh (1:25) 1.1
complain (1:39) 0.92
recall (1:51) 0.81
shoot (1:53) 0.79
knock (1:63) 0.73
strike (1:62) 0.73
guess (1:67) 0.7
act (1:91) 0.58
pull (1:92) 0.58
hit (1:116) 0.5
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Table 2: Verbal distribution of the at-construction in the ICE-GB corpus
run (2:368) 0.46
wonder (1:129) 0.46
get (5:2806) -1.01
come (1:1817) -1.78
Total (423:8247)
In  addition  to  the  raw  frequencies,  we  calculated  the  collocation  strength,
following Stefanowitsch & Gries’ (2003) collexeme analysis (implemented with
the Fisher exact test), and ranked the distribution according to these values. Such
a measure has been shown to be superior to raw or relative frequencies (cf. Gries
et al. 2005), since it takes into account the overall frequency of the construction
and the frequency with which each verb occurs  elsewhere in  the corpus.  The
rationale  is  that  the  occurrence  of  a  verb  in  a  construction  is  all  the  more
statistically  significant  if  the verb is  less  common in other constructions.  The
benefit  of  using  collexeme  analysis  for  our  study  is  that  it  ranks  the  more
significant verbs higher in the list, even if these verbs may not be among the most
frequent in the at-construction (e.g., scream and swing occur only twice in the
construction but are nonetheless in the top ten of most attracted collexemes).
Some other verbs that happen to be more common than some of the significant
collexemes  (like  get)  are  less  significant  because  they  have  a  high  overall
frequency in the corpus. A collostructional strength over 1.301 signals that the
verb is significantly attracted to the construction: in statistical terms, there is less
than 5% chance that the occurrence of the verb in that construction is due to
chance.  Conversely,  a  collostructional  strength  under  -1.301  signifies  that  the
verb is repelled by the construction and stands out as dispreferred vis-à-vis other
verbs.  It  does  not  always  mean  that  the  occurrence  of  this  verb  in  the
construction is  odd or  ill-formed,  neither  that  it  is  perceived as  atypical,  but
simply that, since the verb occurs in many other syntactic contexts, its occurrence
in this one does not tell us much about the construction’s meaning governing the
lexical compatibility. Any value between these two thresholds corresponds to a
verb that is neither significantly attracted nor repelled to the construction as it
appears in the corpus, and is thus inconclusive. The lines in Table 2 separate the
three levels of significance and the grey background marks the verbs that are
significantly attracted/repulsed. We removed from Table 2 eleven significantly
attracted verbs which occur less than three times in the whole corpus; those are:
gawp, glare, glower, marvel, quail, snigger and waggle (occurring only once)
and batter, carp, pound and probe (occurring only twice).
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Concerning these low-frequency verbs, one of the reviewers remarked that the
ranking yielded by collostructional analysis sometimes seems counter-intuitive,
in that it may poorly reflect intuitions about which verbs make typical examples
of  the  conative  construction.  For  example,  even if  not  presented in  the  table
above for the sake of clarity, carp (with a collostructional strength of 2.18) ranks
higher  in  the  list  than  get  which  according  to  the  Fisher  exact  test  is
non-significantly repelled by the construction. However, carp at  seems to be a
rare use of the construction, while get at sounds more familiar and typical and
hence seems to be more cognitively accessible (i.e., more entrenched). While this
is intuitively appealing, some comments are in order. First, this seemingly odd
result is probably to be attributed to the relatively small size of our sample, the
appearance of carp in the most significantly attracted collexemes being probably
an artefact  of  the corpus.  The verb carp,  even if  rare in English altogether,11
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occurs only twice in the one-million words corpus, and, as it turns out, once in
combination with the at-construction. It is very likely that in a bigger corpus,
carp would be ranked lower in significance. Second, we would like to stress that
carp and get instantiate different aspects of the at-construction (metaphorically
construed directed action for the former and the allative schema for the latter), so
their relative prototypicality vis-à-vis a general, overarching abstraction over all
uses of the construction does not make much sense in our analysis, since we do
not  a  priori  acknowledge  such  a  construction.  Third,  this  raises  again  the
puzzling question of the relation between frequencies extracted from corpus data
and cognitive representation, which is largely yet to be addressed. It seems that
in  this  case,  the  ranking  yielded  by  collostructional  analysis  does  not  always
reflect degrees of prototypicality, while ranking by raw frequency would be more
intuitively correct. Clearly, there is more to entrenchment than frequency of use,
either raw or statistically  corrected by a  significance test  as  in  the context  of
collostructional analysis. The fact that raw frequencies make better predictions
on the intuitive prototypicality of get  vs. carp  thus seems purely coincidental,
and  irrelevant  to  any  attempt  at  making  a  corpus-based  statement  about
cognitive representations. Finally, the difference in raw frequency should not be
overrated either; the difference for get versus carp in the at-frameis 5:1 on a total
of 423.12 The strength of a collostructional analysis is that it  more adequately
reveals general  trends in the lexical  distribution, by bringing in the necessary
statistical correction for any bias relative to the verb or the construction.
The significantly attracted verbs can be grouped according to the facet of the
at-construction they evoke:
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(i) Instantiation of the constructional meaning ‘directed action’
– Visual perception (look, glance, stare, gaze, peer) especially represented by
look, by far the most frequent verb in the distribution.
– Sound emission, readily construable as directed actions: shout, scream.
– A verb denoting an attitude or a reaction towards the referent of the at-phrase,
smile.
– Inherently directed actions: point, aim, and fire.13
(ii) Allative schema: pick (here in the sense of “scratch”), clutch, pluck, flick, plus
motion verbs such as swing, dive and leap;
(iii) Ablative schema: tug, suck;
(iv) Allative/ablative schema: work (cited as such by Broccias 2001).
(v) Miscellaneous verbs which do not fall under any of the above categories and
probably elude the constructional generalization: sniff, hint.14
The  most  striking  fact  in  this  distribution  is  the  preponderance  of  visual
perception:  verbs  of  visual  perception  account  for  the  lion’s  share  of  the
distribution (80%), especially look, which is also the most frequent and the most
attracted  verb  in  the  distribution,  and  even  though  the  other  verbs  of  visual
perception are far less frequent, they are still among the ones most attracted by
the  construction;  suffice  it  to  say  that  all  verbs  of  visual  perception  in  the
distribution are significantly attracted by the construction. If we collapse all verbs
of visual perception into one category and all others into another to evaluate the
collostruction strength of the semantic feature of visual perception in general, we
obtain a very high attraction of visual perception (243.44) and, conversely, a high
repulsion of the other category (-193.55).
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In comparison, instances of the allative schema are rare in the corpus, and
instances  of  the  ablative  schema even more so.  The verbs  exemplifying these
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4. Lexical origin and alternations
schemata  are  generally  less  significantly  attracted  than  the  verbs  of  visual
perception.  This  fact  contrasts  with  the  treatment  of  the  construction  in  the
literature.  As  said  earlier,  the  meaning  of  “attempted  action”  is  usually
mentioned as a typical use of the at-construction, to the exclusion of more basic
and common uses.
Let us now return to the typical distributional features of argument structure
constructions listed in Section 2, repeated below:
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(i) The distribution of the construction is skewed towards a single verb V.
(ii) The central meaning of V is close (if not identical) to the meaning of the
construction.
(iii) The distribution contains many hyponyms of V.
Do these properties hold for the at-construction? Property (i) clearly holds: the
construction is  biased towards look.  Property  (iii)  also holds:  the distribution
contains a number of hyponyms of look (gaze, gawp, glance, glare, glower, peer
and stare). As to property (ii), it appears not to hold if we accept the analysis
presented in Section 3.2 that the central meaning of the construction is ‘directed
action’,  since  the  basic  semantics  of  look  is  saliently  concerned  with  visual
perception which is more than just directed action.
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Under this  view,  the  at-construction  contrasts  with  more  typical  examples,
such as the ditransitive or the intransitive-motion constructions, in that while its
distribution  is  indeed  biased  towards  one  single  verb,  this  verb  does  not
straightforwardly  determine  the  constructional  meaning.  In  the  case  of  the
at-construction,  there is  evidently  much more delexicalized semantic  material
than in the case of typical ASCs, since the verb loses its semantic essence (notion
of  visual  perception).  This  is  most  clearly  seen if  we compare sentences with
ASCs  combined  with  a  verb  that  does  not  elaborate  the  meaning  of  the
construction, such as the following:
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(18) The truck rumbled through the tunnel (#without moving). (intransitive-motion)
(19) Billy shot at the sherif (without looking at him). (at-construction)
(18) conveys a meaning (MOTION) sufficiently similar to that of go, the most
frequent and prototypical verb of the intransitive-motion construction, but (19)
clearly does not convey the meaning of look,  as the addition between brackets
shows. Note that adding an equivalent comment to (18) (without moving) gives
rise to a semantic anomaly.
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The  theory  of  the  lexical  origin  of  constructional  meaning  holds  that  the
semantic material  stored in constructions originates in the meaning of  lexical
item through a process of abstraction. Some lexical material can be lost in the
process and only a “schematized” part of the original meaning is carried over to
the construction. In the case of the at-construction, there is evidently much more
delexicalized semantic material than in the case of typical ASCs, since the verb
loses its semantic essence (notion of visual perception). If the at-construction
had the same configuration as the typical ASCs, its constructional meaning would
include  the  concept  of  visual  perception.  Since  such  is  not  the  case,  the
at-construction  turns  out  to  be  a  counter-example  to  the  lexical  origin
hypothesis.
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As noted in the previous section, the lexical origin of constructional meaning
predicts that the at-construction should convey ‘visual perception’ as its central
44
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4.1 The at-construction and the lexical origin
hypothesis
meaning  (and  not  ‘directed  action’),  since  look  seems  to  be  its  prototypical
instance in actual usage. In other words, unlike with what one finds with other
ASCs,  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  the  lexical  bias  displayed  by  the
at-construction and the schematic meaning that has to be generalized over the
meaning of individual verbs in order to account for instances of the at-frame in
terms of a productive generalization (cf. Section 3.2). In the following section, we
try to provide a coherent explanation suggesting that:
(i) despite the empirical result according to which ‘look’ should be the central
meaning of the construction, ‘directed action’ makes a better choice if we are to
give a plausible account of how the construction is used and generalized, and that
mechanisms of meaning extensions are not a plausible solution to resolve the
discrepancy;
(ii) the lexical meaning is only one source of constructional meaning which, however,
does not account for all cases of productive generalizations, and that a more
general learning strategy need to be at work, of which the facilitating effect of
lexical biases is a mere byproduct.
We  conclude  our  study  by  returning  to  the  case  of  the  conative
at-constructions, which even more likely than the directional at-construction do
not have a clear lexical  origin.  Our suggestion is  that  alternations themselves
might play a greater role in the acquisition of constructional meaning than is
commonly assumed in the cognitive linguistic literature.
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As we noted in the previous section, if the analysis of Section 3.2 is correct, the
at-construction seems to be a counter-example to the lexical origin hypothesis.
However, it may not make much sense to expect the at-construction to conform
to the hypothesis to the same extent as more typical constructions, since there is
no verb in English that directly lexicalizes the meaning ‘directed action’. Actually,
in most cases, the semantic structure of the verbs only incorporates reference to
an entity that can be directed (but need not be so in all instances of the verb) and
the construction profiles this aspect. So whatever the most prototypical instances
may be, they are necessarily more specific than the meaning of the construction,
and  there  is  thus  no  way  in  which  the  lexical  origin  hypothesis  can
straightforwardly apply.
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At the same time, a constructional schema may plausibly emerge on the basis
of shared commonalities between a number of instances, even if there is no single
verb  that  lexicalizes  this  exact  schematic  meaning.  As  Goldberg  (2006:   89),
talking about the transitive construction, notes, “the correlation between form
and meaning can be learned by noting their association across several distinct
verbs,  each with relatively low frequency”.  The meaning ‘directed action’  may
well emerge through a similar process. One problem with this account is that it
ignores the role of frequency and lexical bias and is thus only explanatory for
constructions whose distribution does not strikingly favor any particular verb,
which is clearly not the case of the at-construction. In line with the correlation
between  token  frequency  and  prototypicality  pervasive  in  general  category
learning (a point on which Goldberg et al. 2004 insist strongly themselves), the
lexical  origin  hypothesis  predicts  that  if  the  distribution  of  a  syntactic
construction is biased towards a given verb, the meaning of that verb should be
recognized  as  the  prototypical  meaning  of  that  construction.  This  prediction
follows  directly  from  the  principles  of  categorization  and  category  learning,
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which prompt learners to identify the prototypical features of the category on the
basis of their frequency. In our case, since an overwhelming proportion of the
instances of the at-construction convey visual perception, it follows that visual
perception should be a component of the central meaning of the construction.
Arguing that it might in fact not be the case, and thus taking the at-construction
as  a  counter-example  to  the  lexical  origin  hypothesis  only  relies  on  the
assumption that  the introspective  analysis  given in Section 3.2 is  correct;  yet
conclusions  based  on  empirical  data  are  more  robust  than  introspective
speculations about the nature of grammatical generalizations. Thus, if we keep
the lexical origin hypothesis as our starting assumption, by virtue of its empirical
support,  the inevitable conclusion suggested by our corpus study is that there
must  indeed  be  a  construction  whose  central  sense  is  “visual  perception”,
imposed  by  the  lexical  bias  towards  look.  In  addition,  there  might  be  an
independent experiential motivation: looking, i.e., directing one’s gaze towards a
target, is probably one of the most simple and basic kind of directed actions that
humans perform, observe and conceive of, and developmentally one of the first
directed  actions.  However,  can  this  central  meaning  of  “visual  perception”
account for the distributional facts?
One typical  feature of  ASCs is  that  they attract  verbs which elaborate their
central meaning. A central meaning “look” would license this feature, since the
construction  is  commonly  used  with  all  kinds  of  verbs  of  volitional  visual
perception.  Recall  that  all  verbs  of  visual  perception  are  among  the  most
significantly verbal collocates of the at-construction in Table 2. This list (look,
glance,  glare,  glower)  does  not  exhaust  the  possibilities  of  the  construction:
goggle, leer, peep are other verbs of visual perception used with the at-frame,
even  if  not  attested  in  the  ICE-GB  corpus.  However,  we  did  not  find  any
indication that this construction is productive outside of the domain of verbs of
looking, which seems to indicate that there is no construction able to convey the
meaning of “look at” by itself (and can thus trigger coercion effects with verbs
that do not have this meaning component, as was the case for squeeze  in  the
caused-motion construction). It might be suggested that some instances of the
directional at-construction integrate a visual component, notably with verbs of
shouting (shout, scream), verbs of laughing (laugh, snigger) or verbs of facial
expressions  (smile).  In  other  words,  shout/smile/laugh at X  can  in  many
contexts be understood as ‘look at X while smiling/shouting/laughing’. However,
it is not at all clear that this visual component is not a mere pragmatic inference,
since it is possible to construe contexts in which similar uses of the same verbs do
not  entail  visual  perception  at  all.  For  example,  one  can  shout  at  someone
without  seeing  them,  while  in  the  other  room  or  behind  a  door;  what  the
construction conveys is only that the referent of the at-phrase is  the intended
‘recipient’ of the shouting.
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It is thus clear that the central meaning “look at” would account for only a
limited portion of  the  distribution.  Other  cases  do not  instantiate  the  central
meaning itself, since they conflict with it in some of their specifications (no visual
perception),  but  they  may  be  partially  categorized  by  the  central  meaning
through a  relation  of  extension.  As  already  indicated,  the  semantic  similarity
required  for  these  extensions  is  fairly  straightforward:  it  is  the  orientational
component common to all directional uses. Extensions from the visual meaning
are thus at least plausible and possibly motivated by this schema it shares with
the other uses. Thus, under this view, there is no a priori reason why ‘look at’
could not be the central meaning since it occurs so frequently in the construction:
all  instances  which  do  not  convey  this  meaning  could  be  accounted  for  by
polysemic extensions.
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However, the weight that we need to lend to extensions under this account is
overwhelming: while the purely visual meaning accounts for a huge number of
tokens (355, i.e.,  84%), it accounts for only a limited number of types (8, i.e.,
17%). This would imply that the remaining 40 types (83%) would have to rely on
extensions  from the  visual  meaning.  In  comparison,  the  extensions  from the
central meaning of the caused-motion and the ditransitive constructions account
for much fewer types: we evaluated this to 49% for the former and a mere 17% for
the latter in the ICE-GB corpus,15 following Goldberg’s (1995) criteria. While this
contrast might not be decisive evidence that the visual meaning is not the central
one (in fact our figures also show that the relative type frequency of the central
meaning can highly vary between different constructions), it remains true that
the directional meaning is a more useful generalization than the visual meaning
because it has a higher type frequency.16 In addition, the lack of productivity of
the visual at-construction suggests that it  is  not an independent construction,
since  the  generalization  of  argument  structure  to  other  verbs  may  more
straightforwardly  rely  on the  more  general  meaning ‘directed action’  than on
polysemic extensions. It  could be argued on the same grounds that the visual
at-construction should be discarded altogether, as its instances can be accounted
for by the directional at-construction.
50
Moreover, the directional at-construction possesses one characteristic feature
of central meanings: it can be used metaphorically. In the case of shout at,  the
directedness  of  the  action  may  be  understood  abstractly:  the  referent  of  the
at-phrase  can  be  the  abstract  target  of  the  action  without  necessarily  being
concretely in the trajectory of an emitted entity (here a shout). The same analysis
applies to instances of laugh at (in the sense of mock), since they can describe
events in which the person being laughed at is absent from the scene. Finally, in
the most abstract case the referent of the at-phrase can even be an abstract entity
denoting  the  cause  or  circumstance  occasioning  a  reaction  from  the  subject
(carp, complain, laugh) or the bringing about of a psychological state (marvel,
quail,  wonder). The abstract entity can refer to state of affairs that cannot be
physically perceived, let alone visually. A possible motivation for this use would
be to see mental entities as objects in the mind with which the individual can
interact;  in  this  mental  scene,  the  reaction  caused  by  a  mental  stimulus  is
directed  towards  this  stimulus.  All  these  cases  are  metaphorical  uses  of  the
directional  at-construction,  not  of  the  visual  at-construction:  the  metaphor
involves aspects of directionality (especially the target role), not of vision proper.
At the very least, it is necessary to extract the meaning ‘directed action’ from the
more specific meaning ‘look at’ in order to account for these cases.
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All  in  all,  it  seems  that  a  more  reasonable  position  is  to  exclude  visual
perception  from  the  central  meaning  of  the  construction.  In  construction
grammar, the constructional meaning is the basis for extending the construction
to verbs not observed in the input. To put it simply, determining the meaning of a
construction boils  down to  figuring  out  why the  verbs  observed with  a  given
construction in the input are allowed in that construction, i.e., what parts of their
semantics  make  them  compatible  with  the  construction.  In  the  case  of  the
at-construction,  only  the  orientational  component  of  look  is  relevant  to  the
question of why this verb is allowed in the construction, as opposed to the visual
component. While both components could be integrated in the representation,
what is grammatically relevant is the presence of an “orientable” entity, but the
exact nature of that entity is irrelevant. It is possible that the at-construction is
first centered on visual perception, but it is unlikely that speakers adhere to this
abstraction for long, as they are gradually exposed to more exemplars which do
not  convey  the  idea  of  visual  perception.  More  plausibly,  speakers  constantly
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adjust  the  form-meaning  mapping,  i.e.,  revise  their  hypotheses  about  which
tokens of meaning are conveyed by either the verb or the construction.
In  short,  our  study  sheds  some  new  light  on  the  complex  nature  of
constructional generalizations. Our investigation of the at-construction  refutes
an extreme interpretation of the lexical origin hypothesis, according to which the
constructional  meaning  assigned  to  a  syntactic  frame  emerges  only  from
abstraction of lexical material from the verbs most frequently occurring in that
frame  and  that  the  statistical  structure  of  the  verbal  distribution  determines
constructional meaning.17 This extreme interpretation would entail that the more
biased the distribution is  towards a single verb,  the more likely it  is  that  the
meaning of that verb will be carried over to the construction. This is clearly not
the case for the at-construction. Instead, there is a discrepancy between the most
frequent  instantiation  of  the  frame  in  actual  usage  and  the  more  abstract
generalization  which  is  more  likely  to  act  as  the  central  meaning  of  the
construction.
53
The  at-construction  differs  in  several  ways  from  more  well-studied
constructions, especially regarding how its meaning relates to usage. These ASCs
have: (i) a central meaning which denote a concrete and basic “humanly relevant
scene” Goldberg (1995: 39-40), (ii) several extensions from this central meaning
based on one or more shared feature(s), (iii) a distribution which reflects this
organization, with the instances of the central meaning as the most frequent ones
and with one single verb, the most basic of its kind, dominating the construction
and closely matching the central meaning of the construction.
54
The at-construction is very different from this model: its central meaning is
much  more  abstract  than  Goldberg’s  “humanly  relevant  scenes”  and,  more
importantly,  in  connection  with  its  abstractness,  it  is  not  lexicalized  by  any
particular verb. It follows that the central meaning is not, and probably can never
be, directly instantiated in actual language use. However, the distribution of the
at-construction is  nonetheless biased towards a single verb (look).  Goldberg’s
(2006:  92)  claim that  “the  input  is  structured in  such a  way as  to  make the
generalization of argument structure constructions straightforward” thus turns
out not to be true for the at-construction in particular,  and for  constructions
whose meaning is not lexicalized in general. This does not entirely counters the
view that the lexical  semantics of  verbs provides the ‘fabric’  of  constructional
meaning: indeed the meaning of the at-construction can be arrived at by noticing
the “orientable” component in the meaning of its typical verbs. But this raises a
number  of  developmental  issues:  if  “the  dominance  of  a  single  verb  in  the
construction  facilitates  the  association  of  the  meaning  of  the  verb  in  the
construction with the construction itself, allowing learners to get a ‘fix’ on the
construction’s  meaning”,  as  Goldberg (2006:  92) claims,  what  is  the effect  of
such a misleading bias towards a verb whose meaning is too specific vis-à-vis the
more  general  meaning  necessary  to  account  for  the  full  productivity  of  the
construction? Is that an impeding effect, as opposed to the facilitating effect of
biases towards general purpose verbs? Do young language learners first associate
this pattern with looking, as the lexical origin hypothesis would predict? If so,
when  and  how  do  they  recover  from  this  “wrong”  generalization  to  a  more
abstract meaning?
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In sum, the lexical origin hypothesis does not tell  us the whole story about
what  drives  constructional  generalization;  while  it  undoubtedly  acts  as  a
facilitating factor and makes accurate predictions for many constructions, it is by
itself  insufficient.  It  is  probably  a  by-product  of  a  more  general  process  of
abstraction  over  the  wholeclausal  meaning,  which  thus  remains  the  default
hypothesis explaining the origin of constructional meaning.
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4.2 A tale of two constructions: remarks on the
conative uses
In this last section, we return to the status of conative uses. In the account
outlined  in  Section  3.2,  the  conative  uses  instantiate  the  meaning  ‘directed
action’  and the verb meaning is  coerced into this  interpretation,  according to
more or less conventionalized integration principles.
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However, we would like to argue that the cognitive plausibility of this account
is questionable. First, it can be regarded as a case of what Croft (1998b: 157) calls
the “generality fallacy”, whereby it  is  assumed that the most general model is
psychologically correct by virtue of its simplicity, which is however no relevant
argument for psychological plausibility. Second, the semantics of conative uses
are not as unpredictable as this account might suggest, and more commonalities
can certainly be ascribed to them than a mere highly abstract ‘directed action’, if
such  an  abstraction  is  adequate  at  all.  Indeed,  while  many  instances  of  the
allative schema at-frame arguably share the meaning ‘directed action’ with the
directional  uses,  it  is  less  straightforwardly  so  for  instances  of  the  ablative
schema (e.g., eat at an apple). In the case of verbs of ingestion, construing the
action of the jaws on ingested food as a directed action is at least far-fetched.
Many other instances with verbs such as work can only be construed as directed
actions of a very abstract kind. As Broccias’ (2001) study reveals, conative uses of
the  at-construction  fall  into  at  least  two  distinguishable  classes  which  follow
some semantic regularity.  Adams (2001) goes even further by suggesting four
distinct  cases  of  conative  uses  (further  divided  into  nine  verb  classes)  which
trigger slightly different semantic interpretations. If polysemy in language is the
rule and not the exception, as is widely assumed in cognitive linguistics, then a
more appropriate account would subdivide the constructional meaning into more
specific subcases.
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Third, the “directed-action”-model might be too powerful by relying too much
on processes of coercion. While it is certainly true that meaning construction in
language is only partially compositional and relies to a large extent on emergent
structure arising from flexible  conceptual  integration in context,  one must  be
careful not to overrate this flexibility. An account taking such a general meaning
as basis runs the risk of being too permissive and overgeneralizing by allotting
too  much  power  to  coercion  processes,  while  the  actual  productivity  of  the
conative at-construction(s) is well constrained.18 It seems that simple restrictions
on the verb’s meaning are not sufficient to constrain this productivity, and we
suggest  that  a  more reasonable  proposal  (and more in  line  with the  spirit  of
construction grammar) would be to let a more specific constructional meaning
bear the burden. We therefore suggest that conative uses should constitute their
own constructional generalization.
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The conative uses of the abstract schema ‘directed action’ cannot, however, be
explained by lexical abstraction over verb classes (as might be the case for the
constructional extensions of the ditransitive discussed in Section 2), since there is
nothing in the usual meaning of the verbs occurring in the conative uses that
would give speakers a hint of what the construction means, and hence allow them
to  generalize  the  construction  to  other  compatible  verbs.  In  our  corpus,  the
conative  uses  of  the  construction are  indeed instantiated by  a  very  wide  and
diverse range of verbs: pick, clutch, swing, waggle, batter, pound, pluck, flick,
dive and leap for the allative schema, and tug, suck and work  for the ablative
schema.  So,  if  it  is  not  the  result  of  lexical  abstraction,  where  does  the
constructional  meaning  of  the  conative  uses  come  from?  Goldberg  (1995)
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suggested the intuitive observation that conative uses of the at-frame “bear an
obvious similarity” to uses of the same frame to encode directed actions in order
to  justify  her  account  in  which  all  uses  are  subsumed  under  the  same
constructional meaning. However, it might well be interpreted as suggesting that
the  two  uses  instantiate  two  distinct  yet  related  subsenses  of  the  same
construction, which would be a case of constructional polysemy. Under this view,
the allative at-construction appears not only to be a mere instantiation of the
direction-action construction, but an extension of it, which can be motivated by a
metaphor construing causal events as motion events.
As first argued by Talmy (1985) and further developed by inter alia  Halliday
(1985) and Langacker (1991), causal events are apprehended as a motion to a
goal (the so-called billiard-ball  model):  the motion is seen as the causal force
manifested by the agent,  and reaching the goal entails the affectedness of the
patient entity.  Along the same lines,  if  the action is  ineffective,  the metaphor
predicts that the goal is not reached, thus the motion is merely directional and
unbounded. By analogy, the meaning ‘directed action’,  which does indeed not
forcefully entail contact with the target, thus seems appropriate to describe the
event.  Similarly,  the  ablative  schema might  be  viewed as  an extension of  the
allative at-construction. As opposed to the allative schema, the ablative schema
does entail contact with the target; it however bears some resemblance to the
allative  schema,  in  that  it  includes  the  notion  that  some  goal  is  not  (fully)
attained.
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However,  such  intuitive  observations  are,  strictly  speaking,  insufficient
evidence that the conative constructions are indeed related to the other uses of
the  at-frame  by  polysemic  links  in  the  minds  of  speakers;  it  casts  again  the
ever-returning  question  of  which  grammar  we  are  dealing  with:  that  of  the
speakers or that of the linguist. Similar comments can be leveled at (cognitive)
analyses of lexical  polysemy, where semantic links are often posited between
different subsenses of the (radial) network without sufficient evidence that these
links are actually cognitively real (see, for instance, Sandra & Rice 1995 or Rice
1996 for an interesting discussion). Besides, the notion of “directedness” as it has
been proposed in the literature for the conative at-constructions may very well be
a case of in-reading attributing to the preposition a notion of directionality that it
most likely does not carry on its own. As it has been suggested elsewhere (e.g.,
Adams 2001),  one possible  explanation for  the source of  directionality  in  the
at-construction would be that it  is  contributed by the preposition at.  While  a
detailed semantic analysis of  this preposition largely exceeds the scope of the
present  paper,  some  critical  comments  against  this  explanation  are  in  order.
Even though, etymologically, directionality may have been a part of the meaning
of  at  (but  only  one:  O.E.  æt,  common P.Gmc.  [cf.  O.N.,  Goth.  at,  O.Fris.  et,
O.H.G. az], from PIE *ad- “to, near, at” [cf. L. ad “to, toward” Skt. adhi “near”]),
this no longer holds for contemporary at  which basically  means “in the close
neighborhood of”  (e.g.,  at  home,  at  the  swimming pool,  etc.).  Even  in  cases
involving motion, such as run at or throw NP at, the directional component may
well be inferred from the meaning of the verb, similar to what happens with other
static locative prepositions such as in and on when used with verbs of motion.19
On the other hand, it is perfectly conceivable that the uses of at with look and its
hyponyms may have arisen through a conceptualization of looking as involving a
kind of metaphorical motion of the gaze towards a target. As Gruber (1967) notes,
look behaves like a verb of motion in terms of the prepositions it combines with
and of the corresponding resulting semantic interpretation. Miller (2003:  119)
presents  evidence  that,  in  the  at-frame,  look  and  its  hyponyms  indeed
“conceptualize the gaze as an entity in motion, directed towards a target but that
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does  not  reach  it”  (our  translation).20  In  other  words,  for  the  directional
at-construction, the etymologically possible meaning “movement towards goal”
may have become frozen, even though it is not clear whether there is any notion
of direction still to be attributed to the preposition.21
Rather than attributing the notion of directedness to the preposition at,  we
suggest  that  it  is  derived from inferencing about  transitive  events  and causal
chains, that are often given a (very abstract) directional representation, with the
Agent  conceived  as  directing  his  action  towards  the  Patient.  In  such  a
“billiard-ball” model of causation, as described above, both  the transitive and
the conative have an aspect of “directedness” to them: what really distinguishes
them is  that,  as  opposed  to  the  direct  impact  on  the  Patient  implied  by  the
transitive, the conative situates the event “in the neighbourhood of the Patient”,
thus deprofiling the end of the causal chain and the necessary contact with the
patient, which is more felicitously described as a mere target (see Croft 1998a for
a  similar  analysis).22  Thus,  the  choice  of  the  preposition  at  to  encode  such
semantic effects, appears not to be related to any notion of directedness that the
preposition might convey (and is unlikely to) and the intended semantic effects
can easily be explained by the more usual (static) meaning of the preposition.
The origin of the – intuitively accessible – aspect of “directedness” that underlies
the two at-constructions is thus constructed from different semantic operations:
in the conative at-construction, it is the inference about the causal action chain;
in the  directional at-construction  it  is  the  (etymologically  possible  yet  now
frozen) semantics  of  at  as  referring to  the goal  of  a  motion event.  We might
actually  be  dealing  with  constructional  homonymy  as  a  result  of  historical
evolution,  rather  than  constructional  polysemy,  as  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that
contemporary speakers perceive the tenuous link between the two uses. While
taken for granted in the polysemy account, this essentially remains an empirical
question still to be verified.
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Thus, instead of trying to force a polysemic network analysis, we would like to
elaborate on an alternative account of the meaning of the conative. Following
Lemmens (1998),  we suggest  that  syntactic  alternations are  another  potential
source for meaning abstraction along with lexical semantics, especially in cases
where such alternations feature a (systematic) semantic contrast between the two
variants.  In  generative  transformational  approaches,  alternations  are  used  to
motivate  transformation  relations  between  syntactic  configurations,  but  in
constructional approaches they are often viewed as surface phenomena irrelevant
to linguistic structure: Goldberg’s (2002) surface generalization hypothesis states
that  constructional  generalizations  are  stronger  than  those  between  different
forms  that  are  semantically  or  syntactically  related.  This  is  probably  why  in
constructional approaches the role of alternations has been under-estimated in
the emergence of constructions.23
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However, maybe not all alternations should be rejected on the grounds of the
surface generalization hypothesis.  The conative  alternation  is  actually  what
distinguishes  the  verbs  instantiating  the  Visual  at-construction  and  those
instantiating the Conative at-construction,  since the latter allow the transitive
variant (e.g., kick the ball vs. kick at the ball), whereas the former do not (e.g.,
look  at  me  vs.  *look  me).24  In  the  case  of  the  conative  at-construction,  the
alternation is thus more important than the verbal distribution for the emerging
constructional meaning. The contrast with the transitive variant can be explained
as  a  Gricean  implicature:  given  its  frequency,  the  transitive  construction  is
assumed  to  be  the  most  “natural”  choice  for  a  given  verb  expressing  the
(transitive) event at hand; using a prepositional construction with at negates the
(prototypical) contact between Agent and Patient (given the semantics of at) and
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4.3 Conclusion
thus downplays the transitivity. The conative frame is syntactically intransitive,
but  it  probably  stands  out  more  markedly  negatively,  that  is,  as  “not
transitive”,  than  other  intransitive  constructions  (such  as  with  die),  precisely
because of the systematic contrast with the more frequent transitive counterpart.
Phylogenetically,  this  pragmatic  reasoning  might  explain  how  the  alternation
came  to  be;  ontogenetically,  speakers  are  undoubtedly  able  to  notice  such
systematic  semantic  differences  between  uses  of  verbs  in  different  syntactic
environments. In fact, this kind of opposition is not unlike that which occurs in
other  contexts  where  a  more  typical  prepositional  construction  expressing
location (e.g., row on the lake, climb on the mountain, etc.) alternates with a
(usually more marked) transitive variant (row the lake, climb the mountain). The
“promotion” to  a  full-fledged Patient  in  the latter  variant  implies  a  notion of
affectedness or completeness (cf. Schlesinger 1995) that is clearly absent from the
prepositional phrase, where the entity merely functions as the location where the
activity takes place.
We suggest, therefore, that a usage-based account should incorporate the fact
that speakers are able to record more general information about alternations and
use  it  to  build  productive  generalizations.  In  this  view,  the  meaning  of  the
conative at-construction, which is often described as a mere shifting of the verbal
profile (see Croft 1998a), would emerge from the systematic semantic contrast
between uses of the same verbs in the transitive frame and in the at-frame. We
still acknowledge that the more regular meaning ‘directed action’ can sometimes
contribute to the interpretation (or might have contributed diachronically to the
emergence  of  the  conative  use),  as  some  instances  might  be  ambiguously
categorized both as a directed action and as a conative.  However,  the explicit
semantic  opposition  with  the  transitive  construction  is  more  informative  and
certainly plays a greater role than previously assumed to make speakers arrive at
the meaning of conative sentences. In fact, the conative alternation (or any other
alternation for  that  matter),  can be  regarded as  a  variation in  syntactic  form
(demoting a direct object to an oblique phrase) that is systematically associated
to a variation in meaning (deprofiling the patient in the transitive schema). As
such, the alternation could be viewed as a higher-level contrastive form-meaning
pair.
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While this suggestion seems plausible, the question of whether alternations are
indeed  a  factor  that  can,  in  some  cases  at  least,  drive  constructional
generalizations  needs  to  be  taken  seriously,  also  in  the  cognitive  linguistic
literature (which usually puts more emphasis on surface generalizations than on
alternations), and is one that should be empirically verified.
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In this paper we presented (i) a refinement of the lexical origin hypothesis for
the at-construction in general, and (ii) a reassessment of the role of alternations
for the conative construction in particular.
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We presented evidence against an extreme interpretation of the lexical origin
hypothesis, according to which the central meaning of constructions is a mere
copy of the meaning of the verb most frequently occurring in it. The problem that
we identified  with  this  interpretation is  (i)  that  it  implies  that  constructional
meanings are limited by the range of lexical meanings, and (ii) that it puts strong
empirical expectations on the distributional properties of constructions which are
not borne out, especially for constructions whose meaning is not lexicalized by
any verb. Taken under the lexical origin hypothesis, our corpus results suggest
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account  is  far-fetched:  that  particular  meaning  cannot  accurately  predict  to
which verbs the construction can be generalized, unless one relies extensively on
mechanisms  of  meaning  extension.  We  argued  that  generalizations  are  more
plausibly and straightforwardly made on the basis of a more abstract yet more
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Notes
1  The authors would like to thank Adele Goldberg, Martin Hilpert, Karin Madlener and
the two anonymous reviewers for their comments on a preliminary version of this paper.
2 Of course that view only holds with the provision that the meaning of the verb is already
known by the hearer at the time the instantiating utterance is heard, which is problematic
in the context of language acquisition by children, where lexical and syntactic learning
occur concomitantly. There is some evidence that knowledge of words and knowledge of
constructions interact and reinforce each other in the emergent grammatical system of the
language learner (see Goodman & Sethuraman 2006), so a simple one-way relation from
lexemes to construction is too simple an account. However, for the time being, we can still
hold the claim that lexical knowledge is at least one of the potential sources from which
constructional meaning emerges.
3 Such biases should not be taken as a specific property of child-directed speech even
though this  result  have  been obtained  from such  data.  Biases  for  some constructions
towards some verbs can be observed in all kinds of adult language too, but they are indeed
even  stronger  in  child  directed  speech.  The  explanation  put  forward  by  Sethuraman
(2004)  is  that  mothers  and  caregivers  intentionally  “simplify”  their  speech  when
addressing to children, thus using a reduced and more basic vocabulary, including verbs.
4  Notation:  V:  verb;  Subj:  Subject;  Obj:  direct  object;  Obj1:  first  direct  object;  Obj2:
second direct object; Obl: Oblique.
5 This is an important precision, especially for polysemous verbs such as make: the sense
which matters  to  characterize  the  meaning of  the  resultative  construction is  ‘cause  to
become’  and occurs  only  in  the  Subj-V-Obj-Obl  syntactic  frame;  the  meaning ‘create’,
occurring  in  the  transitive  construction,  is  irrelevant  vis-à-vis  the  meaning  of  the
construction.
6 Throughout this  article,  we use the term ‘frame’  as  a  neutral  indicator to refer  to a
particular  syntactic  structure,  while  we  reserve  the  term  ‘construction’  for  the
Construction  Grammar  representations  pairing  a  syntactic  form  with  a  schematic
meaning.
7 That is, without an intervening direct object. Even though this option is syntactically
possible and without any doubt semantically related to the cases we deal with here (as in
throw mud at or fire a weapon at), we restrict this study to the intransitive at-frame.
8  Note  that  this  analysis  concurs  with  Croft’s  (1998a)  causal  approach  to  argument
structure,  where alternations are analyzed as differences in what portion of the causal
chain  is  profiled  by  the  verb.  See  Croft  (1998a:44-45)  for  a  causal  approach  to  the
“attempted action” scenario of the conative.
9 Goldberg (1995:64) actually uses the label “Theme” instead of “Target”, which however
seems infelicitous here, since this argument does not undergo a change of location (which,
next to change of state, is usually the definitional property of themes). The possibility that
this label may a priori bespecific to the at-construction and not occur in other argument
structure constructions is not at odds with Goldberg’s theory, where argument roles are
construction-specific concepts.
10 Thanks to ICE-GB’s structural annotations, we could query for this pattern regardless
of word order. We included all kinds of clausal configurations (actives, passives, questions,
relatives  ...)  except  clefts  and  there-sentences;  we  excluded  these  because  it  was  not
Sethuraman,  N.  2004.  Influence  of  Parental  Input  on  Learning  Argument  Structure
Constructions.  In   :  On-Line  Proceedings  supplement  of  Boston  University  Child
Language  Development  28,  http://128.197.86.186/posters/Sethuraman.pdf,  last
accessed 19th October 2009.
Sethuraman,  Nitya  &  Judith  C.  Goodman.  2004.  Children’s  mastery  of  the  transitive
construction.  In   :  Online  Proceedings  of  the  32nd  Session  of  the  Child  Language
Research Forum. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
Stefanowitsch, A. & S. Gries. 2003. Collostructions: investigating the interaction between
words and constructions. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 8.2: 209-243.
Van der Leek, F. 1996. The English conative construction: a compositional account. In :
Dobrin, L., Singer, K. & L. McNair (eds.) CLS 32: The Main Session. Papers from the
32th Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago, 363–378.
Wade N. & M. Swanston. 2001. Visual perception: an introduction. Routledge: London.
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possible to extract them automatically.
11 For example, the verb carp occurs 80 times in the BNC (in 45 different texts on a total
of 4,048 texts; normalised frequency of 0.81 instances per million words); get has 213,376
hits (in 3,661 different texts; normalised frequency: 2170.36 instances per million words
(queries done via BNCWeb interface at http://bncweb.lancs.ac.uk).
12  The  deceptive  nature  of  the  intuitive  evaluation can be  revealed  by  turning  things
around and considering whether speakers, when asked to produce a sentence with these
verbs, would produce an at-frame more readily than another construction.
13 As one of our reviewers notes, it may seem surprising that we classified shoot but not
fire  as  instantiating  the  allative  schema,  although  their  uses  in  the  at-frame  are
semantically very similar: they can both refer to the triggering of a firearm in the direction
of a target, without mentioning whether the projectile actually reaches the target. Clearly,
both are directed actions, but only shoot qualifies for the allative schema since it can entail
contact while fire  never does. Indeed, in the transitive construction, the direct objectof
shoot  can be a  patient  with which a  projectile  makes contact  (cf.  example (5a))  while
thatof  fire  is always a weapon, and no use of this verb entails contact on a patient. As
mentioned  earlier,  the  allative  schema backgrounds  the  notion  of  contact  and  merely
implies it, which means that this notion must still be available in the semantic structure of
the verb for it to be compatible with the construction; this is why we conclude that fire
does not instantiate the allative schema.
14 Hint at may be more felicitously described as an idiomatic verb-preposition sequence
in which the motivation for using this preposition is no longer clearly identifiable. In the
case of sniff at, the contrast with its transitive counterpart resembles that between other
conative/transitive variants in that in many instances the latter somehow entails a higher
degree of affectedness of the non-subject argument than the former.
15 Figures taken from Perek (2010).
16 The exact type frequency of the directional meaning depends on what we accept as
instances of ‘directed action’. Under the most restrictive definition (i.e., verbs that license
directionality in the concrete sense), the type frequency would be 16 (including the eight
verbs  of  looking).  In  Broccias’  (2001)  analysis,  many  verbs  instantiating  the  allative
schema also license a concrete directional  component (e.g.,  clutch,  run,  shoot,  strike);
including  these  would  increase  the  type  frequency  to  26.  The  productivity  of  the
directional meaning in our corpus is thus twice to three times higher than that of the
visual meaning, and possibly even more if directionality is understood abstractly.
17 This point was already noted concerning the transitive construction (Sethuraman and
Goodman 2004). We thank Adele Goldberg (p.c.) for bringing this to our attention.
18 Boas (2008) makes similar comments on Goldberg’s (1995) treatment of the resultative
construction.
19  Interestingly,  for  many  ‘basic’  motion  verbs,  such  as  go,  come,  walk,  etc.  at  is
impossible *go at home, *walk at the park (meaning “in the direction of”); instead the
‘true’ directional preposition to is to be used.
20 See also Wade & Swanston (2001) for a discussion from a psychological point of view.
21 This construal of looking as motion can also be found in other languages than English,
as the translations of the following English example to Dutch and Polish show:
(20) a. He is looking at his brother.
       b. Dutch: Hij kijkt naar zijn broer
                     he look.PRES.3SG toward his brother
       c. Polish: Patrze na jego brata.
                     look.PRES.3SG on his brother.ACC.
Dutch encodes looking with a purely directional preposition, naar ‘toward’. Polish uses a
locative  preposition  and  an  accusative  NP,  a  combination  which  yields  a  motion
interpretation in this language, even though the preposition is normally static (but a static
interpretation would require the locative case). Many other expressions further support
this cross-linguistic construal of looking as involving motion: Dutch een blik werpen op
‘throw a look on’, Swedish kasta ett öga på and French jeter un oeil sur ‘throw an eye on’.
22 In similar vein, in systemic grammar, the inert patient of a transitive event is called a
“Goal”; see Lemmens (1998) for some discussion.
23 One of our reviewers notes that this claim is perhaps overstated and takes the example
of statistical preemption. The basic rationale of the latter is that if there are two roughly
equivalent ways A and B to convey a message but learners never hear B in contexts where
B would have been a priori  possible, they will deduce that B is ungrammatical. In the
realm of argument structure, this mechanism is meant to provide learners with a form of
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negative evidence to inform them about which verbs are allowed in which constructions. It
is  certainly  true  that  the  idea  of  alternations  (i.e.,  pairs  of  functionally  related
constructions)  is  implicit  in  the  concept  of  statistical  preemption;  however,  statistical
preemption  only  applies  when  the  constructions  are  in  competition,  i.e.,  functionally
equivalent,  which  is  not  the  case  of  the  conative  and  transitive  constructions  (except
perhaps in some instances, where the semantic difference between the two variants is not
evident;  compare  for  example  to  rub  the  counter  vs.  to  rub  at  the  counter).  While
mainstream construction grammar implicitly assumes that speakers perceive functional
equivalence  (or  at  least  relatedness),  to  our  knowledge  functionally  divergent
constructions are always considered in their own right, in that the syntax and semantics of
one construction should be considered independently  of  those of  others,  even if  some
constructions  may  be  related  to  some  degree;  this  is  the  basic  argument  against
derivations  that  Goldberg  (2002)  makes,  in  favor  of  the  surface  generalizations
hypothesis.
24  There  is  only  one  specific  construction  where  this  alternation  is  possible  to  look
someone in the eye(s)/face. Strikingly, only look and stare can occur in this construction,
but not the other verbs of perception (cf. Miller 2003: 119).
References
Electronic reference
Florent Perek & Maarten Lemmens, « Getting at the meaning of the English
at-construction: the case of a constructional split », CogniTextes [Online],
Volume 5 | 2010, Online since 20 December 2010, Connection on 12 April 2016. URL :
http://cognitextes.revues.org/331
Authors
Florent Perek
Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies & Université Lille 3, Albertstraße 19, D-79104
Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
Maarten Lemmens
Université Lille 3 & CNRS UMR 8163, Domaine Universitaire du Pont de Bois, BP 60149,
F-59653 Villeneuve d'Ascq, France
http://perso.univ-lille3.fr/~mlemmens/Lille3/Welcome.html
By this author
Editor's Foreword [Full text]
Published in CogniTextes, Volume 8 | 2012
A quantitative analysis of the use of posture verbs by French-speaking learners
of Dutch [Full text]
Published in CogniTextes, Volume 8 | 2012
Reframing treason: metaphors of change and progress in new Labour discourse
[Full text]
Published in CogniTextes, Volume 3 | 2009
Editorial statement [Full text]
Published in CogniTextes, Volume 1 | 2007
Copyright
CogniTextes est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative Commons
Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.
http://cognitextes.revues.org/331
